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The personification of the corporation was once of central con-
cern to American jurisprudence. Diverse political and economic
views, phrased in the language of legal discourse, were essential to
discussions of the corporation's design, form, function, and opera-
tion. After the Second World War, however, the place of the corpo-
ration in law had ceased to be controversial, and both theoreticians
and practitioners concerned themselves instead with organizational
theory and economic analysis of corporate behavior. The corpora-
tion as a legal institution ceased to be of interest. The historical
and jurisprudential debates which had consumed the energies of
some of the leading legal scholars were relegated to the introduc-
tory pages of corporation law textbooks, if they were discussed at
all. As a result, a modern lawyer knows only that a corporation is
considered a legal person but finds that terminology devoid of
content.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century lawyers, however,
knew that when they called a corporation a person the reference
meant something. The Dartmouth College decision defined the
corporation for the American bar for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury.1 Handed down in the period when corporations were first
emerging as a regular vehicle for economic enterprise, the case held
that a corporation was an artificial person that owed its existence
more to government than to its corporators and, as a creature of
positive law, had only the rights and privileges that obtained from
the government's grant.2
By the late nineteenth century, however, the process for grant-
ing corporate charters had radically changed. Corporations had be-
come, if not commonplace, then at least not unusual. While the
artificial corporate person enjoyed favor among businessmen who
sought the protections it offered, it had also become the object of
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fear among those concerned with the power of concentrated
wealth. The states chose to abandon their attempts to regulate cor-
porations through their charters and sought instead to regulate
harmful activities, regardless of the form of the economic enter-
prise. At the same time, the corporate bar sought to release the
corporation from the strictures of artificiality and to protect corpo-
rate property from emerging regulation. They did so by reformu-
lating the corporation as a species of partnership. While the at-
tempt failed, it laid the groundwork for the conception of the
corporation as a real person, which saw the corporation as an au-
tonomous, self-directed entity in which rights inhered. That vision
successfully transformed corporate jurisprudence. Later, when the
legal realists undermined the concept of rights, the terminology re-
mained, bereft of its theoretical underpinning.' As a result, the
rhetorical convention that a corporation is a legal person remains,
though the convention utterly fails to capture the understanding of
the corporation conveyed by any modern theory.4
3 The current state of corporate jurisprudence is neatly exemplified by the contrasting
attitudes manifested by the Supreme Court in two recent decisions. In First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court rejected and characterized as "extreme" the view that "cor-
porations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights granted them by the State." 435
U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). The Court then proceeded to hold that corporations have first
amendment free speech rights. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, however, the
Court upheld state anti-takeover legislation, stating, "[w]e think the Court of Appeals failed
to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation
of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a
product of state law." 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987). The Court then quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's Dartmouth College proclamation that the corporation is an "artificial being" and
cited a passage of Justice Rehnquists' dissent in Bellotti, which included the very position
the majority in that case had characterized as extreme. Amazingly, Justice Powell wrote
both opinions.
' In fact, most corporations textbooks pay scant attention to the history and jurispru-
dence of the corporation. The autonomy of the corporation is not, for most texts, an issue
but rather a given. See, for example, Harry G. Henn, Cases and Materials on the Laws of
Corporations 1-8 (1974); Detlev F. Vagts, Basic Corporation Law 1-5 (2d ed. 1979) (a sophis-
ticated introduction setting out some of the theoretical and historical tensions but one
which sees corporation law history in linear, accretive, and historicist terms); Lewis D. Solo-
mon, Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., and Donald E. Schwartz, Corporations: Law and Policy,
Materials and Problems 1-7 (1982). While recognizing disagreements in historical interpre-
tation, Solomon, et. al., say, "We tend to view the business corporation today as an associa-
tion of individuals, organized to further a common purpose, and possessing a combination of
attributes (e.g., continuity of existence, limited liability, separate legal entity, centralized
management and transferability of interests) which distinguishes the corporation from other
forms of association. Much of the history of corporations is a chronology of the evolution of
those attributes." Id. at 1.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF THE CORPORATION
American law has always recognized that people's activities
could be formally organized and that the resulting organizations
could be dealt with as units. Personification, however, is important
because it became far more than a quaint device making it possible
for the law to deal with organized business entities. In American
legal and economic history, personification has been vital because
it (1) implies a single and unitary source of control over the collec-
tive property of the corporation's members, (2) defines, encourages
and legitimates the corporation as an autonomous, creative, self-
directed economic being, and (3) captures rights, ultimately even
constitutional rights, for corporations thereby giving corporate
property unprecedented protection from the state.'
The concept of the personified corporation resulted from a cri-
sis of legal imagination that accompanied the maturation of
America's economy at the end of the nineteenth century and
largely preceded the country's entry into what economic historians
call the second industrial revolution. It is therefore impossible to
understand the jurisprudential debate about the corporation apart
from the history of the role played by the business corporation in
politics and the economy.
Business corporations, of which there were only a handful
when America adopted the constitution, grew in size and number
as the country expanded and exploited its resources.' While wealth
and reach demanded more and larger institutions in finance and
transportation, most citizens retained their revolutionary republi-
can fear of concentrated power and skepticism about the utility of
large institutions. Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century
5 It therefore was not until the triumph of personification that corporations could
achieve the crucial freedoms to use property in the most fully productive manner, what
economic historian David Landes has called "full property." See David Landes, The Un-
bound Prometheus 16 (1969) ("full in the sense that the various components of ownership
were united in the person or persons of the possessor, who could use the object of ownership
and dispose of it as he saw fit").
6 Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, in Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5
J.Econ.Hist. 1, 22-23 (1945), see the modern corporation as a product of a time no earlier
than the Jacksonian period. Rostow sees the take-off in the American economy a few years
later, in the late 1840s. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 36-37 (1960).
He also notes that the take-off is "preceded or accompanied by radical change in . . . mar-
ket organization." Id. at 51. While corporations had not yet achieved the full property sta-
tus, they had ceased to be unusual ways of organizing capital by the late 1840s.
7 See Handlin and Handlin, 5 J.Econ.Hist. at 18-19 (cited in note 6); Drew R. McCoy,
The Elusive Republic 68-69, 148-52 (1980). Even the principles of economics were anti-cor-
porate. See Adam Smith, 1 The Wealth of Nations 144-46, 470 (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skin-
ner, and W.B. Todd, eds. 1976).
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business was generally conducted by single proprietorships or part-
nerships rather than corporations.' Industrial enterprises in partic-
ular, because they did not partake of the public character of utili-
ties or transportation facilities, remained the archetypal private
and personal business concern.
The radical rethinking of the role of the corporation at the
end of the nineteenth century was but one aspect of a newly
emerging society. Early in the century, institutional barriers to the
dynamic use of property were rapidly replaced by a myriad of state
supports for economic development. An entrepreneurial elite
whose incomes and fortunes were based on the construction of the
country's infrastructure as well as nascent manufacturers replaced
an old elite whose wealth had been built on the accumulation of
land and agricultural surplus.9 This "release of energy," in Willard
Hurst's famous phrase, put much of the control of the developing
economy, as well as the risks and rewards, into private hands.10
While the corporation did not always dominate economic develop-
ment, nowhere was the transformation of the economy more ap-
parent than in the emergence of a private law of corporations. Cor-
porations had become an individual's tool.
The challenge that private corporations posed to the sover-
eignty of the state, to its monopoly on the legitimate use of coer-
cive power, was not fully apparent until about the 1880s because,
before that time, the vast majority of corporations were affairs lim-
ited in scope and capacity." Before the 1880s, the state held larger
corporations, such as banks, under comparatively strict reign,
through the limited and specified powers granted in their charters
of incorporation, through strict construction of those charters by
the courts, and through special classes of laws, such as banking
laws, designed to regulate the specific affairs of their undertaking. 2
' See Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Se-
curities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus.Hist.Rev. 105 (1955). Navin and Sears emphasize that even some
of the largest industrial concerns in the nation were closely held by families. The large cor-
porate enterprise was limited to the railroads; the publicly held corporation was almost non-
existent among industrial enterprises.
The classic studies are Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth (1947)
and Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought (1948). Two recent studies
demonstrate that the distributional effects of this growth were uneven, both geographically
and by class. See Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era (2d ed. 1987) and Morton J. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977).
1o James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Cen-
tury United States 3-32 (1956).
" George Heberton Evans, Business Incorporations in the United States 1800-1943 14-
19 (1948).
2 James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the
1444 [54:1441
Personification of the Corporation
In that sense, America's large businesses continued to be seen as
existing by virtue of the state's wishes.
By the late nineteenth century, however, this state of affairs
was no longer tenable. Extremely large businesses were often the
property of one man or a closely-knit family. Increasingly, how-
ever, large businesses adopted the impersonal management struc-
tures that characterized the railroad corporations, heretofore the
nation's largest economic units, and were no longer clearly owned
by one individual or a family.13 Moreover, many of these enter-
prises were based on manufacturing and trade, and they struck al-
most no one as existing at the state's behest.
If the marriage of the large business to the corporation in-
verted the public idea of a corporation from tool to disembodied
entity and of business from personal to impersonal, it positively
traumatized legal thinking. While tradition, caution, and prefer-
ence had established corporate property as private, the place of the
corporation in law was deeply ambiguous. With characteristics re-
sembling those of individuals as well as governments, the large cor-
poration did not fit well into a legal system designed to mediate
conflicts between individuals and between individuals and govern-
ment. The growing divergence throughout the century between
municipal and business corporations suggested that legal thinking
would regard the business corporations as more private than pub-
lic, but it did not suggest how a private law of individuals would
become a private law of individuals and corporations.1"
Several conceptions of the corporation were available to theo-
rists and policy makers. Corporations could have been seen as
analogous to either individuals or governments. Alternatively,
these analogies could have been rejected and theorists and policy-
makers could have developed an entirely new body of law to super-
sede contemporary doctrine. The debate over the alternatives was
conducted not only in the theoretical and jurisprudential disputes
which raged among scholars and jurists, but also in the counsel of-
fices and court chambers where practicing lawyers struggled with
the challenge that this growing anomaly presented.
Late nineteenth century America was prepared to think about
United States 1780-1970 4-18 (1970).
,S Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand 79-205, 287-89 (1977).
4 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1057, 1095-1120
(1980). For an extended treatment of this evolution using the city of New York as an exam-
ple, see Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of
New York in American Law, 1730-1870 (1983).
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a new approach to governing the production and distribution of
the country's growing wealth. Visionary industrial intellectuals,
utopians and reformists alike, were widely popular in the last quar-
ter of the nineteenth century. They sought ways that a new order
might be integrated into, or even supplant, existing society.' 5 Nor
was the legal community immune to desires to recast its own place
in the polity. The codification movement, an attempt to render the
common law into unified statutes embodying democratic principles
suitable to a modern society, demonstrated that at least some
members of the fraternity were dissatisfied with the way law was
practiced and with some of its political foundations. It was an ef-
fort, however, that was unable to capture the imagination of the
majority of the bar though it remained an important issue in some
areas of the country until the 1880s, precisely the time when the
corporation question began to arise. 6 Its experimental capacity
both diverted and enervated by the struggles over codification, le-
gal imagination .produced no new and transcendent vision of the
corporation.
Even without such a vision, however, American legal thinking
underwent a profound reformation. A different corporation was
created, one in which industrialism's new found powers ultimately
equaled some of those of a government, but whose new conceptual
underpinnings were clothed in older language and symbols. It
might seem that as businesses grew in the mid-nineteenth century,
jurists would have rethought the corporation's position in society
based on its increasing ability to concentrate economic power, es-
pecially since the large corporations of the time, such as railroads
and banks, were acknowledged to have public goals even though
they were private institutions. Had jurists focused on economic
power, the analogy of a corporation to a government might have
forcefully suggested itself.
This analogy was doomed to failure, however, because of the
tendency to think of dynamic property as a private matter. Earlier
failures of enterprises such as publicly owned canals, some of
which had driven states into bankruptcy or near bankruptcy, cast a
pall on direct government ownership and management of anything
'5 The literature on late nineteenth century reform is voluminous. The best introduc-
tion to the period is Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order: 1877-1920 (1967).
16 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 403-11 (2d ed. 1985). Ironically,
the one area where the codifiers achieved some real success was in commercial law, where
traditional practice was written into statutes. This success inhibited even the incremental
ability of the courts to change an operating conception of commercial relations and helped
force the legal community to look outside standard legal texts for ideas.
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resembling a business. 17 Although it restricted the powers of mu-
nicipal corporations, the willingness of the states to grant public
powers and other subsidies to private corporations while simulta-
neously restricting the powers of municipal corporations suggests
that government was happy to forgo both the direct risks and re-
wards of economic development.
The unwillingness of the legal community to see the corpora-
tion as an extension of government reflected its awareness of the
political conundrum of imperia in imperio. The distinction be-
tween public and private spheres was at the heart of the theoreti-
cal challenge of intermediary institutions in the legal and political
order.'8 That a second set of public institutions could operate
within the sovereignty of the state and federal governments was
simply dismissed as beyond the bounds of acceptable thought.
And, as changes in state incorporation policies eliminated any no-
tion that incorporation was a special grant from the state, even the
public nature of a corporation's purpose could be called into doubt.
II. THE LEGACY OF Dartmouth College
Until the last few years of the nineteenth century jurists took
for granted that when they called a corporation a person, they were
indulging in a standard convention, a kind of legal shorthand, that
meant nothing more than treating a group of corporators, and the
property each brought to a corporate entity, as a unit instead of
individually. For most of the century, personification depended
upon two interrelated but analytically distinguishable propositions:
that the corporation was an artificial entity and that the corpora-
tion existed only through the grant of incorporation from the sov-
ereign. At first glance these propositions appear to be the same,
but in fact the first deals with an individualist conception of the
use of property and the second with the state's relationship to its
17 See, for example, Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era 135, 176-77, 297-98, 358-59 (cited in note
9). The decline of public enterprise is the major theme of Hartz's study of Pennsylvania.
Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought (cited in note 9).
18 The corporation poses a theoretical problem for liberal jurisprudence because it is a
collection of individuals and wealth that operates more or less autonomously. The common
law and the American constitutional system are both liberal legal systems in that they are
prepared to mediate conflicts between the government and its citizens. They are less adept
at dealing with intermediary institutions, such as the corporation, which can claim, at least
in part, both the loyalty of citizens and independence from government control. This com-
ment will use the concept of "intermediary institutions" to describe those associations, both
formally and informally constituted, which stand apart from the state and which claim, in
one degree or another, the loyalty and attention of citizens.
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citizens. That the two were almost always used together in legal
arguments, however, reinforced the view that the corporation was
but a legal fiction. Before the corporation could achieve autonomy
from state control, legal thought thus had to recognize both that
organized collective holding of property was not unnatural and
that the state was not the originator of corporate entities. The con-
fusion which surrounded the two issues complicated the attempts
by jurists in the last years of the century to synthesize a new con-
ception of the corporation.
At the heart of the assertion that corporations were artificial
were the twin beliefs that private property was an individual right
and that an individual would not manage the property of others
with the same interest with which he cared for his own. These be-
liefs found expression in law both in overt statements about corpo-
rate property and in judicial interpretations of the restrictions
placed upon corporations by their charters. These restrictions in-
volved a paradox: on the one hand, the assumption that no corpo-
ration could survive without the privileges granted in its char-
ter-because otherwise the property would be better kept by
separate individuals-but on the other hand, the concern that the
corporation constituted a privilege powerful enough to require re-
strictions. Each side of the paradox, however, reinforced the view
of corporate property as unnatural.
The clearest statements of this early nineteenth century view
of corporate property as artificial appear in the seminal Dartmouth
College case.19 The issue in the case was whether New Hampshire
could alter the charter granted to the trustees of the college by
George III in 1789. New Hampshire had passed laws that trans-
ferred control of Dartmouth from the trustees to a board of over-
seers appointed by the governor. The Supreme Court held that
New Hampshire's acts were an unconstitutional impairment of the
contractual obligation of the state, as George III's successor, to the
1-9 17 U.S. 518 (1819). The arguments of counsel as well as the opinions delivered by
Chief Justice Marshall and Associate Justices Washington and Story reflect the tension be-
tween the need to assert the sanctity of private property and the legitimate sovereignty of
the state. A careful reading of the three opinions, however, suggests that the Justices were
not always thinking of the same institutions when they discussed chartered corporations.
Marshall's opinion, the most celebrated, deals with corporations in the most general terms
and, while it is clear that he saw a distinction between public and private corporations, id.
at 629-39, he does not specifically mention business corporations. Washington's opinion, the
narrowest of the three, is more concerned with contractual obligation than with the nature
of the corporation. Id. at 654-66. Story's opinion is the one which resonates most clearly to
modern ears. He accepts and elaborates Marshall's distinction and specifically draws busi-
ness corporations under the protections Marshall outlined. Id. at 667-77.
1448 [54:1441
Personification of the Corporation
trustees.
The distinction between public and private property which
underlies the decision rested on the contention that collective
property could exist artificially as private property even though
the state had chartered the collective property for a purpose which
the sovereign found amenable. Indeed, nearly all of Daniel Web-
ster's argument for the college was devoted to proving exactly that,
and he addressed the unnaturalness of chartered property directly:
And does the granting of a charter, which is only done to per-
petuate the trust in a more convenient manner, make any dif-
ference? . . . The very object sought in obtaining such char-
ter, and in giving property to such a corporation, is to make
and keep it private property, and to clothe it with all the se-
curity and inviolability of private property. The intent is, that
there shall be a legal private ownership.
Webster's colleague Hopkinson succinctly summed up the point:
"Indeed, there may be supposed to be an ultimate reference to the
public good, in granting all charters of incorporation; but this does
not change the property from private to public."20
The justices agreed with Webster and Hopkinson. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall made the public-private distinction the centerpiece
of his opinion for the Court. Casting charters as contracts between
the state and the corporators in their collective capacity, Marshall
distinguished between public and private incorporations. A public
incorporation required a grant of political power, use only of public
property, and public objects of incorporation. That the objects of
incorporation were congruent with operations that the state could
legitimately undertake did not alone transform the corporation's
property into public property, and neither did the use of public
property.2 A private corporation, however, was limited in the exer-
cise of its powers because it "is an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible, . . . possess[ing] only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its
very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. ' 22 Unlike an individual,
whose use of property was coextensive with the public good, a cor-
poration was restricted to its objects in the use of its property. The
20 Id. at 573-74, 617.
21 Id. at 629-35. See also id. at 667-69 (Story). Justice Story makes specific references to
business corporations, including insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies.
22 Id. at 636.
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power of perpetual succession, the capacity to sue and be sued, in
short what Marshall called "individuality," were conveniences
forming a legal metaphor for an unusual way of holding property. 3
Marshall and Story, firm believers in private property, of course
meant nothing pejorative when they deemed corporations artificial
entities; artificiality was the basis on which private property re-
mained secure. The public, in turn, was protected by the careful
consideration of charters and the limitations embedded in them.
Judicial interpretation of charters, granted either directly by
the legislature or later under the authority of general incorporation
laws, followed both the language and structure of Marshall's opin-
ion throughout the nineteenth century. Even under the pressures
generated by a growing economy, the courts generally resisted the
temptation to stretch charters very far. They did not have to: new
charters were being granted regularly for all types of businesses,
especially newly emerging manufacturing concerns. While it was
still true that even in the large and wealthy states incorporations
only rarely exceeded a few dozen per year, the trend pointed to-
ward wider use of the corporate form by businessmen. 4
In reiterating general principles of what constituted artificial
persons and in deciding if corporations came under statutes men-
tioning "persons," however, the courts began subtly to narrow the
Dartmouth College vision of artificiality. Courts began to assimi-
late artificial persons to natural ones and to draw larger numbers
of commercial associations under the rubric of the protected corpo-
ration, all the while maintaining the language of artificiality. For
example, in 1841, a New York court made the analogy between
persons and corporations virtually an equation when it stated that
the very purpose of a corporation was the creation of a unit which
could transact business as would a natural person.25 Various courts
affirmed the legitimacy of corporations created by general incorpo-
ration laws26 and in the early 1880s a federal Circuit Court ruled
23 Id. at 636-37. Marshall's more explicit use of personification came in anticipating the
objection that the power of perpetual succession was a political one. "Its immortality no
more confers on it political power, or a political character, than immortality would confer
such power or character on a natural person." Id. at 636 (emphasis added). The use of the
words "natural" and "artificial" suggests that in both cases he meant that the special pow-
ers, in this case perpetual succession, were defined in terms of the entity's property-holding
capacity. The natural way to hold property was as an individual human being; the artificial
way was as a corporation.
24 Evans, Business Incorporations at 10 (cited in note 11).
25 The People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill 616, 620-21 (N.Y.Sul.Ct. 1841).
26 See Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. 812 (1849); Grangers' Life & Health Insurance Com-
pany v. Kamper, 73 Ala. 325 (1882); Lithgow Man. Co. v. Fitch, 5 Ky.L.Rep. 605 (Sup.Ct.
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that the powers granted to an association, not its nominal designa-
tion by law, determined whether it was a corporation.17 The prac-
tice of the courts had long been to treat corporations as persons
when they met all the criteria necessary for a natural person to be
included under a given statute,2 8 although some courts denomi-
nated them persons under looser circumstances. More specifically,
a Georgia court ruled that a corporation engaged in the manufac-
ture and repair of machinery was allowed to obtain a lien author-
ized to individual machinists under the code then in effect, and a
Wisconsin court affirmed the personhood of a corporation named
in a statute authorizing persons named to construct dams.2
9
Courts were more commonly asked to define the scope of pow-
ers granted under corporate charters than to determine whether
corporations were included under statutes mentioning persons.
Personification meant very little when a charter specified the pow-
ers of a corporation and the general rule was to construe charters
strictly.30 The large number of cases which required judges to de-
cide whether a corporation had exceeded the powers delineated in
its charter, however, belied the premises upon which corporate
powers were granted in the first instance. If corporations could
constantly test the limits of their authority, they contained a dyna-
mism which had not been supposed to exist at the time of
Dartmouth College. This robustness undermined the beliefs about
collective property which had then prevailed and from which the
Court had drawn the inference of the artificiality of corporate
property. The courts thus continued to confirm the legitimacy of
private property and the propriety of individuals seeking profit
through collective organization, while refusing to recognize a cor-
porate personality separate from the summed interests of the indi-
viduals who made up the corporation. The strength of organized
1884); Van Etten v. Eaton, 19 Mich. 186 (1869); Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416
(1876).
27 Fargo v. L., N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 6 F. 787 (C.C.D.Ind. 1881).
28 See for example, United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. 391 (1826); Douglass v. P. M. S.S.
Co., 4 Cal. 304 (1854); Emerson v. Goodwin, 9 Conn. 422 (1833); Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. City of Richmond, 67 Va. 1 (1875); Miller's Ex'or v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. 110
(1876).
2' Loudon v. Coleman, 59 Ga. 653 (1877); Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Man. Co., 10 Wis.
351 (1860). But see Betts v. Menard, 1 Ill. 395 (1831) (corporations should be treated as
persons only when necessary to give effect to the terms of their charters).
30 Where there was ambiguity in its wording, a charter was construed strictly against
the corporation. See Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 50 U.S. 172 (1850); Rice
v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. 358 (1861); Minturn v. Larue, Fed.Cas.No. 9, 646 (1858); Tompkins
v. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co., 21 F. 370 (1883). Furthermore, powers did not flow by
implication. See Moran v. Commissioners of Miami County, 67 U.S. 722 (1862).
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property and the limitations on the corporate form forced the bar
to ponder the fate of corporations and to wonder what might re-
place them."
The public's anti-corporate sentiment stemmed from the very
thing that made corporations successful: their ability to concen-
trate capital. That concentration made real the challenge to the
second proposition embodied in Dartmouth College's fictive con-
ception of the corporation, the vision of the corporation as a grant
from the state. The grant theory of the corporation was rhetori-
cally the more powerful of the two propositions because it invoked
the hierarchy of power which legitimated the modern state. The
contraposition of state and individual citizen which characterized
the theory of society that prevailed in Western political thought
put all intermediary institutions in jeopardy. As such an institu-
tion, the corporation had to derive its powers from the state or else
it would be perceived as a challenger to its authority. The succes-
sive stripping away of first the symbols and then the substance of
that vision made clear the challenge the corporation presented.
At the time of Dartmouth College, of course, the questions
about the power of intermediary institutions were not so apparent.
Webster's oration before the court fully explicated the necessarily
derivative place of the corporation. While the contract theory of
incorporation developed in Dartmouth College was clearly
designed to limit the state's ability to interfere with the operation
of the corporation, it was equally clear that, as Webster put it, "a
corporate existence and capacity are given to the trustees." Chief
Justice Marshall extended Webster's reasoning to conclude that a
corporation existed "only in contemplation of law;" Dartmouth
College had been "created by the crown," not by the corporators,
for "[t]he corporation is the assignee of their rights."32
That a corporation derived its powers from the sovereign was
inherent in the contractual conception of the grant theory. The
government granted nothing unless it agreed to the objects of the
proposed corporation. The benefits that the corporation was ex-
pected to produce were exchanged for the powers necessary to pro-
duce them. As Marshall explained, "The objects for which a corpo-
" Compare, for example, Andrew Allison, The Rise and Probable Decline of Private
Corporations in America, 7 Reports of the American Bar Association 241 (1884) (speculating
on the effects of the hostility to corporations) with The Growth of Corporate Organization,
20 Central L. J. 481 (1885) (noting that corporations appeared to be the vehicles behind
economic growth despite the hostility).
32 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 553, 636, 642.
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ration is created are universally such as the government wishes to
promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this ben-
efit constitutes the consideration, and, in most cases, the sole con-
sideration of the grant." Marshall elaborated on two facets of the
contractual grant, that incorporation was prior to collective action
and that the sovereign actually considered the request before ap-
proving it. The corporators "apply to the government, state their
beneficent object, and offer to advance the money necessary for its
accomplishment, provided the government will confer on the in-
strument which is to execute their designs the capacity to execute
them. The proposition is considered and approved."3 Justices
Story and Washington expanded on Marshall's theory in their con-
curring opinions, and Story's is saturated with references to the
sovereign as originator of corporations.34
An egalitarian spirit, however, pervaded early nineteenth cen-
tury law, insisting that the state limit the special, often monopolis-
tic privileges extended in corporate charters. Even these limited
special privileges proved, however, to be an open invitation to cor-
ruption for those who sought them and to political favoritism in
the state legislatures granting them. Indeed, the anti-corporate
spirit tended to focus more on the privileges and the corruption of
favor seekers than on the idea of incorporation itself, though in
some minds the two were inseparable. In a remarkable innovation
in political economy, the Jacksonians sought to foster legislative
purity as well as restore equality when they demanded and ulti-
mately won universal access to the corporate form, with restric-
tions on the power of the legislature to grant special perquisites."5
Free incorporation did more than salve the political conscience
of Jacksonian America; it changed the character of the business
corporation by undermining a central premise of Dartmouth Col-
lege. American incorporation practice had once helped to sustain
belief in the artificiality of the corporation by suggesting that the
3 Id. at 637-38.
31 For Justice Washington's opinion, see id. at 654-66. Washington devotes four pages
to explaining the rights and obligations of each party to a grant. The first eleven pages of
Justice Story's opinion examine the nature of corporations as then conceived and explicitly
includes business corporations. Id. at 666-77. Clearly, he saw the business corporation and
the charitable corporation in the same light insofar as their relationship to the state was
concerned. Id. at 670-71. Justice Story's discussion of the contractual conception of the
grant is fully compatible with Marshall's, id. at 683-84, and he made it clear that he saw a
political hierarchy, even if the sovereign voluntarily contracted away some of its superior
powers. See id. at 685-86.
3 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson 336-37 (1945); Evans, Business
Incorporations at 11 (cited in note 11).
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privilege of incorporation was a considered grant by the state for a
quasi-public purpose, often one defined as much by the desires of
the legislature as by the incorporators. Free incorporation, how-
ever, suggested that the corporate form was an individual's natural
tool, as useful a device for independence and growth as a farmer's
plow. Under free incorporation the process of chartering ceased to
be a legislative matter and became an administrative and proce-
dural one. While state incorporation statutes maintained structural
control over the corporate form, the sovereign no longer considered
the proposal of the corporators and then granted a charter. Uncou-
pling special privilege from the charters also weakened the connec-
tion of corporations to broader community service. The belief that
the privilege of incorporation should have some clear benefit to the
larger community gave way to the view that the larger community
was served by strengthening the individuals who formed corpora-
tions. The states, once the moving force behind the "private" de-
velopment of banks, roads, canals, and other institutions vital to
economic growth, stood by as individuals formed new corporations.
With the exception of the building of the railroads, the states' role
in superintending economic development after the 1850s was lim-
ited to fostering growth by less direct subsidy.
If it had been the intent of the justices in Dartmouth College
to mollify the state legislatures with reassurances that in granting
charters they had wisely considered each one, the failure of their
effort was quickly manifest. The legislatures immediately began to
include clauses reserving to the state the power to amend or repeal
the charters that they granted.36 This assertion of the power of the
legislature over its creations effectively overruled Dartmouth Col-
lege and reestablished state control. In the everyday practice of
state government, however, power and its application were sepa-
31 See Friedman, A History of American Law at 197-98 (cited in note 16). Compare
Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom at 66 (cited in note 10). Hurst argues that these
reservations indicate that the state legislatures favored dynamic property over secure prop-
erty. Given the general anti-corporate sentiment in the years which followed Dartmouth
College, this interpretation seems problematic. His example, in which states allowed rail-
roads to override the claims of turnpikes and river transport, does not explain why states
also included reservations in the charters of the most dynamic organized properties of all,
the newly emerging manufacturing corporations. It would seem that these corporations
might have benefited more from clauses which explicitly confirmed their right to override
the claims of less dynamic property than from reservations. More probably, reservations
were simply a reassertion of complete sovereignty. See 1 Rose's Notes on the United States
Reports 985-88 (rev.ed. 1917) (discussing Dartmouth College). Especially interesting is a
quotation from Justice Field discussing the reservation clause in terms of sovereignty. See
id. at 985-86, quoting Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1872).
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rate matters and the states were often less than energetic in super-
vising their progeny. In the case of some long-standing businesses
the courts simply presumed that they were corporations in order to
bring the firms under their protection.37 More importantly, free in-
corporation by itself militated against the ability of state legisla-
tures to take responsibility for each corporation created. The
search for some scheme to regulate corporate behavior took on a
more general outlook than if state legislatures had vigorously
tracked the actions of every corporation. The exercise of the police
power through general regulations clearly dominated whatever ef-
fort the legislatures made concerning individual corporations.3,
The growing autonomy of corporations, in part the result of the
failure of charter-based regulation, was a key part of the corpora-
tion problem facing the states in the late nineteenth century. Not
until the 1890s did it become clear that while most aspects of cor-
porate structure and behavior were beyond the boundaries of legit-
imate interference by the state, egregious business behavior fell
within the legitimate province of general regulation.
III. THE PARTNERSHIP ANALYSIS AND Santa Clara
The transformation of the private law of corporations from
1819 to the 1920s is best described as a move from a circumstance
in which a corporation could do only those things specifically al-
lowed by its charter to one in which a corporation could do any-
thing not specifically prohibited to it. As has already been sug-
gested, the rise of general incorporation laws and the general
elimination of the special privileges that accompanied special char-
ters played major roles in making the corporation appear to be a
natural way to organize property. The regulatory legislation en-
acted by the states after the Civil War performed much the same
function in that it made corporations seem unexceptional. While
state governments remained interested in the form business orga-
nizations took, the attention of state legislatures turned increas-
ingly to their behavior. This change in emphasis further legiti-
mated the autonomy of the corporation by removing the state even
37 See United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. 391 (1826); United States Bank v. Dandridge,
25 U.S. 63 (1827); Hager's Town Turnpike Road Co. v. Creeger, 5 Harris & Johnson 122
(Md. 1820).
38 The literature is voluminous and the topic has been central to lawyers and legal his-
torians for years. Among the most sophisticated recent works are Harry Scheiber, The Road
to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 Per-
spectives in Am.Hist. 327 (1971) and James Willard Hurst, Law and Markets in United
States History (1982).
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further from the inner life of a corporation. The state had once
been the source of a corporation's purpose and power. By the be-
ginning of the Gilded Age the state supplied only a corporation's
robes and, for some businesses, a subsidy.
Crucial limitations on corporate activity nonetheless still ex-
isted by virtue of a corporation's status. In an expanding national
economy perhaps the most important of these was the foreign cor-
poration doctrine. The issue of whether a corporation could con-
duct business in a state in which it was not chartered first came
before the Supreme Court in 1839 in Bank of Augusta v. Earle.39 A
Georgia bank had issued bills of exchange which an Alabama citi-
zen refused to honor because he claimed that the bank was a for-
eign corporation that consequently had no right to contract in a
sovereign state apart from its own. The bank argued that it had
the rights of a citizen under Article IV's privileges and immunities
clause40 and could therefore enter any state and engage in busi-
ness. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney held that
while corporations did not enjoy the rights of natural citizens, they
had the right to do business in other states if they were not ex-
cluded by the positive acts of those states. Many states picked up
on Taney's suggestion and enacted legislation which regulated, re-
stricted, and sometimes prohibited foreign corporations from doing
business within their boundaries. 41 Until it was possible to super-
sede such state regulation with friendlier legislation, or overthrow
the states' powers altogether and establish the corporation as an
entity beyond their powers, corporate interstate expansion was left
in an uncertain position.42
" 38 U.S. 518 (1839).
40 U.S.Const. art. IV, § 2.
41 See Hurst, Legitimacy at 64-65 (cited in note 12); Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A.
Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 326-27 (5th ed. 1976).
Kelly and Harbison argue that the ability of states to control corporate behavior began to be
limited in 1877, and they see Santa Clara Co. v. South. Pac. Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886),
as critical to a further limitation on state interference. Hurst agrees in more general terms,
dating these limits from the 1880s. Morton Horwitz, however, disputes Santa Clara's signifi-
cance. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate The-
ory, 88 W.Va.L.Rev. 173, 188-90 (1985). All these historians agree, however, on the central
role that the new conception of corporate personality played in eventually undermining re-
strictions on corporate action.
42 The leading case affirming Bank of Augusta is Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 178-82
(1868) (dictum). Extending the principle in 1872, a North Carolina court ruled that a legis-
lature had the right to impose conditions upon the ability of a foreign corporation to sue in
its courts. See The Ex. B'nk of Columbia v. Tiddy and Davidson, 67 N.C. 169 (1872). In
1883 a court held that the legislature could forbid, under threat of criminal penalty, the
agents of a foreign insurance company from doing business in the state. See Pierce v. The
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In the 1880s it appeared that the time was ripe for a new ap-
proach to the corporation. The collapse of the fictive conception of
the corporation was evident. Corporate property was no longer
considered artificial, and organized business under the umbrella of
incorporation was, if not yet the norm, certainly quite common. No
one seriously believed that corporations' economic powers
stemmed from their charters, though the rhetoric of the grant the-
ory lingered on despite its substantive hollowness. Advocates of
regulation were forced to turn to awkward conceptions of busi-
nesses "affected with the public interest" to carve out a way to
deal effectively with corporate power.43 The corporate bar, on the
other hand, searched desperately for some way to free its clients
from restrictions on interstate operations and regulatory measures,
as well as for some rubric under which the businesses could oper-
ate in new fields with greater flexibility and control.
Faced with public hostility towards large business and a crip-
pled legal conception of the corporate form, some members of the
corporate bar put forward a modification of the fictive person
formula of the corporation during the 1880s. These attorneys
hoped to expand the rights of corporations while preserving their
structural organization by suggesting that the proper way to think
of corporations was that they were similar to partnerships. Victor
Morawetz, later a member of New York's Cravath firm, first
broached this subject in his 1882 treatise on the law of private bus-
iness corporations. Because it was clear to him that a corporation's
powers did not derive from the state, he suggested that "there is
no reason of immediate justice to others, why a number of individ-
uals should not be permitted to form a corporation of their own
free will, and without first obtaining permission from the legisla-
ture, just as they may form a partnership or enter into ordinary
contracts with each other." 44 This radical disaggregation of the cor-
poration, however, was not an attempt to increase the vulnerability
of corporators or their businesses, but was rather the last attempt
to reconceive the corporation while keeping within the common
People, 106 Ill. 11 (1883).
While the privileges and immunities clause remains inapplicable to corporations, the
Court eventually found limitations on state power to interfere with foreign corporations in-
herent in the commerce clause and the equal protection clause. For a comprehensive mod-
em discussion, see Western & Southern L. I. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
43 See, for example, Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-
30 (1877).
4' Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Other Than Chari-
table § 29 at 24 (1882).
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law framework of the American legal system.
The core of the new proposals was the elimination of the fic-
tive person conception. As Henry 0. Taylor, another member of
the New York bar, put it, "the fiction of the 'legal person' has out-
lived its usefulness, and is no longer adequate for the purposes of
an accurate treatment of the legal relations arising through the
prosecution of a corporate enterprise. By dismissing this fiction a
clearer view may be had of the actual human beings interested,
whose rights may then be determined without unnecessary mystifi-
cation. '45 Both Taylor and Morawetz did not wish to abandon the
link that Marshall had established in Dartmouth College between
private property rights and the corporation, but both felt that bet-
ter protection was to be had by making explicit the reason why
corporate property was sacrosanct. As Morawetz wrote, "the rights
and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights
and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary
being. ' 46
Having grounded the protection of corporate property in the
rights of the shareholders, the treatise writers also moved to estab-
lish the legitimacy of the corporate structure on non-legal founda-
tions. While the grounding of corporate rights in the rights of cor-
porate shareholders entailed a separation of the legal form from
the actual business operations of the corporation, this perspective
signaled that the vanguard of the corporate bar had given up the
view that corporations were an artificial way to hold property and
had accepted the corporate form as natural. Taylor strove to syn-
thesize this new understanding: "In 'a corporation,' according to
the usual understanding of the term by business men as well as
lawyers, exist elements which are the manifestations of law, and
physical elements which are in no sense the manifestations of
law."'47 Morawetz was even sharper in dismissing the notion that
the state stood behind all corporations: "The fact that the popular
conception of a copartnership is essentially that of a corporation
shows that the idea of a corporation does not necessarily imply a
grant of corporate power by statute. '48
4' Henry 0. Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Having Capital
Stock iv (1884).
46 Morawetz, Law of Private Corporations § 1 at 2.
47 Taylor, Law of Private Corporations § 23 at 14.
48 Morawetz, Law of Private Corporations § 28 at 24. See also Taylor, Law of Private
Corporations § 60 at 34 (arguing that "under the general enabling statutes, the importance
of the 'special sanction' has passed away, and a corporation usually requires no more special
sanction than a limited partnership"). John Norton Pomeroy, reviewing Taylor's work, ar-
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It was now clear that individuals, not the state, empowered
corporations. What differences, then, remained to distinguish a
corporation from a partnership? In Taylor's eyes, there were but
two. First, in a partnership all partners were agents; in contrast, all
shareholders were not agents of the corporation. Second, a share-
holder could generally remove himself from any liability resulting
from corporate action by selling his shares; partners retained liabil-
ity for actions taken on behalf of the partnership even after they
had disposed of their partnership shares.4 The two conditions
were connected by a single vital thread: partners often managed
partnerships actively while most shareholders were passive inves-
tors in corporations. 50
The case made by these writers was that corporations operate
with the flexibility of a partnership and the property protection of
an individual, while remaining under the control of a relatively
limited body of managers. Morawetz was the more expansive of the
two, hoping to free corporate action from the limits of corporate
charters. He suggested that the only limitation on the acts of cor-
porations should be that of general public policy: "Inasmuch as the
prohibition of the common law against any unauthorized exercise
of corporate power is based upon grounds of public policy alone, it
seems but reasonable that the effect of this prohibition upon the
legal validity of corporate acts should be determined by the re-
quirements of public policy." 51 While Taylor recognized the legiti-
macy of charter limitations, he construed these limitations nar-
gued as follows:
The common-law conception of the 'legal personality' of the metaphysical entity con-
stituting the corporation, entirely distinct from its individual numbers, arose at a time
when corporations were all created by special charters generally granted by the crown;
when very few of them were 'stock' corporations; when ...the legal status of the
corporators was wholly swallowed up in the 'legal person' of the corporation, and when
corporations were in reality, as a necessary result from this creation and legal position,
monopolies.. . . [O]ur American courts, both State and national, have, with few excep-
tions, gone on and applied the same language, the same conceptions, and the same
doctrines to these associations, which were originally applied to corporations as they
existed under purely common-law notions and regulations.
Note, The Legal Idea of the Corporation, 19 Amer.L.Rev. 114, 115-16 (1885) (quoting Pome-
roy) (emphasis in original).
" Taylor, Law of Private Corporations § 61 at 34 (cited in note 45).
11 Morawetz also saw this distinction as key. "The business of a corporation is man-
aged, on behalf of the association in its corporate capacity, by particular agents, selected by
shareholders. On the other hand, every act and every contract of a copartnership is, in legal
contemplation, the act or contract of the individual members of the firm." Morawetz, Law
of Private Corporations § 3 at 4 (cited in note 44).
5 Id. § 31 at 26. Morawetz uses similar reasoning to evaluate executed ultra vires con-
tracts. Id.
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rowly, preserving broad managerial control over the fate of
corporate funds: "By filing articles of association, or accepting a
charter, shareholders agree that the corporate enterprise shall be
managed as provided for in the charter, or in the enabling statute
and articles of association. Their individual right to manage the
funds subscribed they surrender into the hands of a majority of
themselves, and into the hands of the officers of the corporation, as
provided for in the constitution." About how the objects of incor-
porations were to be determined, however, Taylor was ambiguous.
While suggesting on the one hand that corporate funds were a kind
of trust fund dedicated to ends defined in the corporate charter,
Taylor on the other hand countenanced state intervention insofar
as the public interest required the attainment of these ends and
creditor interference when corporate action might "endanger the
payment of their claims." The objects were thus transformed from
the sole legitimate aims of incorporation to restrictions protecting
concerned parties from injury.2
This reconceptualization was not just an academic exercise, for
a number of courts found the new approach of value. Perhaps the
most important decisions demonstrating the inroads of the new vi-
sion were The Railroad Tax Cases.53 The Circuit Court held that
private corporations were entitled to equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment: "It would be a most singular re-
sult if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of
every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the
states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the per-
son becomes a member of a corporation. ' 54 Justice Field, riding
circuit, looked through the corporation and saw the property of the
shareholders: "To deprive the corporation of its property, or to
burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or
52 Taylor, Law of Corporations §§ 38, 32-37 (cited in note 45).
.3 13 F. 722 (C.C.D.Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as moot, San Mateo County v. South-
ern Pac. R.R.Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885). See also Circuit Judge Gilbert's remarks in United
States v. Stanford, 70 F. 346, 358 (9th Cir. 1895), aff'd, 161 U.S. 412 (1896), for a suggestion
as to how long this view retained its currency.
" The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 744. The fourteenth amendment's due process
clause protects "persons." The full text of the fourteenth amendment, § 1, reads,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S.Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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to lessen its yalue. ' '5 5 Circuit Judge Sawyer, in his concurring opin-
ion, used language even more suggestive of the partnership vision
of the corporation. The fourteenth amendment, he suggested,
"must, at least, through the corporation include the natural per-
sons who compose the corporation, and who are the beneficial own-
ers of all the property, the technical and legal title to which is in
the corporation in trust for the corporators." 56 Most interesting of
all, however, is that one of the attorneys for defendant Southern
Pacific Railroad was John Norton Pomeroy.
Pomeroy, a professor of law at Hastings Law College, was an
early and persuasive proponent of the partnership theory of the
corporation. His vision of the corporation was adopted wholesale
by Judge Sawyer and was a clear influence on Justice Field. Saw-
yer, in fact, twice adopted Pomeroy's language as his own in his
opinion. While enunciating a distinction between the property
rights of corporators and those of the corporate entity, Pomeroy
argued that this distinction was of no importance in determining
the extent to which corporate property deserved protection.
Whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an artificial,
metaphysical being, separate and distinct from the individual
members, and whatever distinctions the common law makes,
in carrying out the technical legal conception, between prop-
erty of the corporation and that of the individual members,
still, in applying the fundamental guaranties of the constitu-
tion, and in thus protecting the rights of property, these meta-
physical and technical notions must give way to the reality.
The truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of protect-
ing rights, the property of all business and trading corpora-
tions is the property of the individual corporators.57
Field, while resisting the impulse to quote Pomeroy directly,
clearly accepted his reasoning: "[T]he courts will look through the
ideal entity and name of the corporation to the persons who com-
pose it, and protect them, though the process be in its name. ' ' 8
" The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747.
56 Id. at 757. He elaborates on this view in the pages of his opinion which immediately
follow the quoted statement, reiterating that he finds the protection of corporate property
not in the person of the corporation but in the persons of the corporators. What is most
interesting about Judge Sawyer's argument is that he cites Chief Justice Marshall's reason-
ing in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1809), where Marshall looked
to the residences of the shareholders to determine the jurisdiction of the court.
57 The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 758. See also id. at 760.
11 Id. at 748. Justice Field and Professor Pomeroy communicated with each other con-
cerning the cases. The confidentiality of the communication and the high regard each had
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It would have been enough for Pomeroy to have influenced
one of the preeminent jurists of his day on so important a topic as
the protection of corporate property. But at least one piece of evi-
dence suggests that his reasoning was also adopted by Roscoe
Conkling, who argued The Railroad Tax Cases before the Supreme
Court59 and whose presence on the committee which drafted the
fourteenth amendment served as a basis for the theory that the
amendment was drafted with corporations in mind.60 It is useful to
see just what Conkling meant when he referred to corporate
persons:
It must be remembered, too, that corporations, as known
in England, and also in America, so long as they were created
by special grant and charter, were ethically and legally more
distinct and independent entities, more substantial and vital
"abstractions," than the voluntary associations, which now,
under general laws free to all, do business under a corporate
or co-operate name, or, in the words of Mr. Justice Grier,
"only a fictitious name." Yet it is to such specially created and
highly endowed and favored corporations, that most of the au-
thorities referred to relate.
The defendant here, in respect of its property, is in law
and in fact but the business style of individual owners united
and co-operating in a common undertaking, and who, as mere
method and convenience, conduct business through corporate
agency."'
Conkling was attempting, therefore, to protect property, individual
for the other suggests that Pomeroy's influence reached beyond that of normal counsel ap-
pearing before the Justice. See especially the letter from Justice Field to Pomeroy dated 28
March 1883, reprinted in Howard Jay Graham, Everyman's Constitution 106-08 (1968).
" The Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot. Because Conkling did not argue the
motion to dismiss, he is not listed as attorney of record in the official reporter. See San
Mateo County v. Sourthern Pac. R.R.Co., 116 U.S. 138. Conkling did, however, argue the
case on the merits before the Court. See 29 L.Ed. at 589.
60 Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, 111-113
(rev.ed. 1937).
"' Oral Argument of Roscoe Conkling, San Mateo Case; Arguments and Decisions
(Hopkins Railroad Collection, Stanford University) reprinted in Graham, Everyman's Con-
stitution at 606 (cited in note 58). What Conkling has abandoned in his oral argument is the
grant theory portion of the fictive conception of the corporation. What remains is a concep-
tion of the corporation as nothing more than a web of legal relations between individuals.
Furthermore, he has given up the belief that collective property is somehow unnatural.
What he has not done is to ascribe to collective property rights independent of, and beyond,
the web of individual contracts. Thus, while he recognized the functional unity of corporate
property, he did not articulate a theory which would have been able to protect its unity
rather than the static value of the property at a given instant.
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property held in corporate form, but not corporate autonomy per
se. His infamous distortion of the proceedings of the committee
which drafted the fourteenth amendment notwithstanding, Conk-
ling was simply searching for a successful formula to preserve pri-
vate property from state predations.
The partnership theory of the corporation propounded by
leading theorists and then embodied in The Railroad Tax Cases
strongly suggests that historians have placed undue emphasis on
the importance of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad.e2 In this tax case, the Court
proclaimed the corporation a person protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Yet, far from representing a
self-consciously radical innovation in the scope of fourteenth
amendment protections as some have claimed, this case merely af-
firmed that corporate property was protected as property of the
corporators.
The evidence suggests that Conkling and Justice Field, the
likeliest sources for a new vision of the corporation in Santa Clara,
could not have had in mind anything but the partnership analogy
that they had espoused in The Railroad Tax Cases. Thus the
Santa Clara Court did not mean to fashion new constitutional doc-
trine with Chief Justice Waite's terse announcement, "The court
62 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Kelly and Harbison, modern historians, have argued that Santa
Clara played a critical role in limiting the power of states to control corporate behavior. See
Kelly and Harbison, American Constitution at 326-27 (cited in note 41). Of more historic
importance, however, was the 1927 publication of Charles and Mary Beards' monumental
The Rise of American Civilization. The Beards contended that corporate property after the
Civil War flourished under the autonomy granted by the addition to the constitution of the
fourteenth amendment and its due process clase. The Beards argued that this "cabalistic
clause," ostensibly part of an amendment designed to shelter newly freed slaves, had been
cunningly designed to bring under its protective aegis all "persons" that had lacked consti-
tutional cover. Santa Clara was thus simply the judicial expression of the intent, however
devious and concealed it had once been, of the amendment's chief authors. Beard and
Beard, The Rise of American Civilization at 112-113 (cited in note 60).
By focusing subsequent scholarly attention on the fourteenth amendment, the Beards
succeeded in casting the personification of the corporation as a constitutional question and
in so doing left the world of day-to-day business law behind. While *the Beards correctly
sensed the importance of personification, they had its story wrong. Constitutional personifi-
cation was but the ultimate reification of a personified view of the corporation that had deep
roots in legal history.
The Beards were also mistaken in their conspiracy theory of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See the following articles by Howard Jay Graham uncoupling the fourteenth amend-
ment from its cabalistic history: The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment,
47 Yale L.J. 371 (1938) (Part I); 48 Yale L.J. 171 (1938) (Part II); Four Letters of Mr.
Justice Field, 47 Yale L.J. 1100 (1938); Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52
Yale L.J. 851 (1943). These articles are reprinted and updated in Graham, Everyman's Con-
stitution (1968) (cited in note 58).
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does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provi-
sion in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does."'63 In response to the court reporter's question
concerning whether he had correctly heard the Chief Justice's an-
nouncement, Waite wrote, "I think your mem. in the California
Railroad Tax cases expresses with sufficient accuracy what was
said before the argument began. I leave it with you to determine
whether anything need be said about it in the report inasmuch as
we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision.' '64
Because court reporters, even Supreme Court reporters, are not
sources of doctrine, it is impossible to assume that the court meant
to do anything more than accept the argument that corporate
property was protected as property of the corporators, no matter
what uses the Court's announcement was put to in later cases. In-
asmuch as the Court also continued to use the term "person" in
describing a corporation, it is clear that the Justices had no inten-
tion of dismissing the fictive conception of the corporation, even if,
for the purpose of protecting property, they were willing to look to
the corporators and not the corporation as the real owner of corpo-
rate property.
IV. THE ORGANICIST REAL PERSON/REAL ENTITY
THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
If Santa Clara was not the source of the modern personifica-
tion of the corporation, but at best only a partial acceptance of the
partnership analogy, then whence the modern theory? The answer
begins with an understanding of the limits of the partnership anal-
ogy. The disjunction between seeing the corporation on the one
hand as nothing more than the aggregate property of the share-
holders and on the other as a functioning business entity proved
impossible to maintain. The partnership analogy ignored two key
truths of corporate enterprise: first, that part of the value of corpo-
rate property was that corporations were ongoing operations pre-
mised on the ability to maintain property as a unit; and, second,
that corporators were rapidly losing any responsibility for the
workings of the firm. The attempt to reconceive corporations on
63 118 U.S. at 396.
" Letter from Chief Justice Waite to J.C.B. Davis, 26 May 1886, quoted in Graham,
Everynan's Constitution at 567 (cited in note 58) (emphasis added).
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individualist grounds had to face the functional reality that indi-
vidual corporators were responsible neither for much of the growth
within a given corporation nor for the adverse consequences of cor-
porate actions.
What then wag required of a successful theory of the corpora-
tion? It could maintain no longer that the corporation received its
powers from the state and that collective property was unnatural,
the premises of the artificial entity theory. Neither could it main-
tain what was untrue, that the corporation was nothing but the
sum of the property of the corporators. A successful theory had to
recognize the functional economic autonomy of the corporation,
derived initially from the corporators and thereafter from the ef-
fective operation of the entity by its management. The corpora-
tion's ability to operate successfully depended upon its legitimacy
in society at large. Legitimacy, in turn, hinged upon the ability of
the theory to describe the corporation accurately enough to make
it a legal unit fully equivalent to its place as an economic unit. To
do that, the theory had to prescribe the corporation's place as at
once subordinate to and independent of government.
That the partnership analogy failed to satisfy the needs of the
legal system is evident from the continued use by the courts of the
terms artificial or fictive person even while adopting the property
protecting reasoning of the partnership analogy. The necessity to
describe a corporation as an entity continued to assert itself in the
language of the courts.
The legal concern over the character of collectivities was by no
means limited to the United States. Very sophisticated disputa-
tions, both theological and political, about the nature of associa-
tions had long been part of the intellectual discourse of continental
Europe, and their resolution had shaped law there for the better
part of six centuries. In the middle of the nineteenth century,
partly as a reaction to the development of the modern state, the
topic began to receive the attention of political thinkers who
sought to understand the place of intermediary institutions in soci-
ety. The most prominent of these thinkers was Otto von Gierke,
whose work on the history and theory of associations asserted their
legitimacy.
The European literature remained largely unread in America
because it was untranslated and seemed inassimilable into the
common law tradition. Nonetheless, during the 1890s a number of
American and English jurists began to draw on such material. Two
works provided the foundation for the debates which would crowd
the pages of legal publications in the ensuing years: Ernst Freund's
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1897 The Legal Nature of Corporations, and Frederic Maitland's
1900 translation of Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Age. 5
It is a sign of just how deep the question of the legitimacy of
the corporation ran that scholars were moved to look beyond tradi-
tional Anglo-American texts in their search for a scheme which
would accommodate the new reality. Beginning in the 1880s occa-
sional articles were published in scattered journals speculating on
the future of the corporation. From the 1890s, however, the insular
American bar was treated to an avalanche of writings on the sub-
ject that drew on sources which were often from unfamiliar legal
cultures or not legally based at all. Furthermore, much of the liter-
ature dealt with the question at a highly abstract level, a mode of
thinking about problems of law which was distinctly novel for a
community which prided itself on being practical and down-to-
earth."6
65 Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897); Otto Gierke, Political Theo-
ries of the Middle Age (Frederic William Maitland trans. 1900). Freund was an assistant
professor of jurisprudence at the University of Chicago at the time, whose publications had
dealt both with historical jurisprudence and private-public relations. Before his graduate
work at Columbia University, he had been educated at the Universities of Heidelberg and
Berlin. Maitland was the preeminent English legal historian of his time. While Gierke's
book explicates the organic background of contemporary continental jurisprudence,
Maitland was most interested in combatting both a virulent individualism and potential
statism. Maitland's interest in Gierke was thus historical and theoretical; he sought for
group autonomy both pedigree and noumenon.
66 The intellectual crisis that confronted the legal community may be understood by
viewing the problem as a change in a system of legal thought which had to be played out at
both theoretical and practical levels. Thomas S. Kuhn's remarkable The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions (1962) defines the process of paradigm shift for the sciences, but the theory
has broader applications. The core of the book - chapter VI, dealing with the discovery of
anomalies unexplainable by reigning theory, chapter VII, demonstrating the profound dis-
ruption caused to a self-contained system of thought through the introduction of factors
outside its accepted boundaries, and chapter VIII, suggesting that the older paradigm per-
sists until a new one can replace it entirely - defines exactly the situation felt by the Amer-
ican bar as it dealt with the problem of the corporation. J.G.A. Pocock has suggested adopt-
ing Kuhn's theory to analyze the problem of change in systems of political thought. As he
puts it: "Men think by communicating language systems; these systems help constitute both
their conceptual worlds and the authority-structures, or social worlds, related to these; the
conceptual and social worlds may each be seen as a context to the other, so that the picture
gains in concreteness. The individual's thinking may now be viewed as a social event, an act
of communication and of response within a paradigm-system, and as a historical event, a
moment in a process of transformation of that system and of the interacting worlds which
both system and act help to constitute and are constituted by." J.G.A. Pocock, Politics,
Language and Time 15 (1973).
Kuhn's work discusses the discrete discoveries and rediscoveries of parts of the replace-
ment paradigm by sometimes scattered individuals, each trying to solve the same problem,
though often in different contexts and quite often uninformed about the nature of each
other's work. This description is apt. Both legal scholars and practitioners were reaching the
same solution at roughly the same time without realizing how valuable each other's work
Personification of the Corporation
The place of the corporation proved to be one of the most con-
fusing jurisprudential problems of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.6 Jurists were drawn to it not simply because
it posed an extremely challenging intellectual puzzle, though that
was clearly part of the attraction. 8 The tendency of people, both
within and without the legal profession, to personify the corpora-
tion was what brought the problem to the forefront of juridical
controversies.6 9 The tendency was not just a problem of theory; the
image of the corporation that dominated legal thought would de-
termine and legitimate the contours of corporate autonomy.70
was in the struggle to formulate a new view of the corporation. Neither should it be surpris-
ing that, through sheer inadvertence, as in Santa Clara, some of them stumbled on a formu-
lation which was to become the new paradigm. The hints at a new conception of the corpo-
ration in Santa Clara did not bear fruit, however, until the older formulation of the place of
the corporation was overthrown and lawyers could begin to make full use of the decision in
courts manned by those who understood the new paradigm. See, for the more general
changes in the legal order, Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law (2d ed.
1976).
The importance of second order statements about the law of the corporation, the juris-
prudence of the corporation, is that they reproduce at the most abstract level the changes
going on at the level of practice. Influence can only be inferred or guessed at, but what is
clear is that the jurisprudential disputes gave a framework to the work of practitioners,
conveying information, projecting an image, and defining thought. It is therefore important
to consider the jurisprudential literature apart from the work of practitioners. It has its own
story and the influence of the practitioners upon it is not always clear. From the point of
view of the historian, therefore, it is important to limit any suggestions of direct influence to
what is cited. All else constitutes only context.
67 See Alexander N6kfim, The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity 48-50 (1938).
8 See Frederic William Maitland, 3 The Collected Papers of Frederic William
Maitland, 308-09 (H.A.L. Fisher ed. 1911). The essay, "Moral Personality and Legal Person-
ality," was the Sidgwick Lecture, given at Newnham College in 1903.
6, See Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 Harv.L.Rev. 404, 404-05
(1916); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17
Colum.L.Rev. 128 (1917); Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 Yale L.J. 283 (1928); Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality (Part 1), 24 Harv.L.Rev. 253 (1911).
70 It is vital not to discount the role that language plays in this context, for it is easy for
historians and other analysts to fall into reductionism and see the image of the corporation
as but the reflection of the economic give and take of the late nineteenth century. The
problems of law are problems of political language in the largest sense. They are the verbal
constructs of the material relations of individuals and collectivities. As a verbal construct,
however, the image of a corporation channels the thinking about corporations and in turn
controls the material relations themselves. As Pocock summarizes Kuhn, "In what he
[Kuhn] calls periods of 'normal science,' paradigms-controlling concepts and theories-so
satisfactorily discharge the intellectual functions expected of them that they authoritatively
indicate not merely the solutions to problems, but the kinds of problems which are to be
conceptualized as requiring solution; and so, dictating the direction, the pattern, the distri-
bution and organization of intellectual endeavor, indicate further the ascription and defini-
tion of authority among the individuals and groups composing the 'scientific community.'"
Pocock, Politics at 13 (cited in note 66). Because those who dealt with the jurisprudence of
the corporation supplied the formula, the language, and the new approaches to understand-
ing the place of the corporation in the society, they led the rest of the bar, instead of simply
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What made the issue so puzzling and appealing was the con-
fluence of concrete historical and abstract theoretical statements, a
condition which guaranteed that arguments would be endlessly re-
peated and summarized in ultimately vain attempts to reconcile
the meaning of words such as "person," "artificial," "natural," and
even "corporation." The attempts to clarify theoretical claims with
a veneer of history7' were countered with abstractions used to give
meaning to history.72 The epistemological challenge was enormous,
but behind all the confusion lay the single question of whether cor-
porations, broadly conceived, were natural outcomes of human so-
cial life or derivative and sterile creations of positive law.
The problem was characterized first as an issue of historical
jurisprudence. Maitland's work used history to attempt to prove
that the common law was not a closed intellectual system, that it
had borrowed ideas, including ones about the corporation, from the
continent. He hoped to transform the individualist precepts which
guided the common law, giving it a capacity to deal with collectivi-
ties.7 3 Virtually all commentators who followed Maitland agreed
with his premises, even if they did not adopt his conclusions. 4
Maitland's purpose was to legitimate intermediary institutions and
to require the common law to come to terms with their reality,
"[flor the morality of common sense the group is person, is right-
and-duty-bearing unit. '75
Maitland and Gierke exposed and criticized the fictive person-
ification theory of association which had historically justified the
reacting to the problem with available jurisprudential tools. As Pocock points out, "under
pressure from the idealist-materialist dichotomy, we have been giving all our attention to
thought as conditioned by social facts outside itself and not enough of our attention to
thought as denoting, referring, assuming, alluding, implying, and as performing a variety of
functions of which the simplest is that of containing and conveying information." Id. at 37.
71 See, for example, E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associa-
tion, 42 Harv.L.Rev. 977, 980-84 (1929); Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54
L.Quart.Rev. 494, 494-95 (1938).
72 See, for example, Maitland's equation of the state and corporations in order to help
explain the basis for associative life. Gierke, Political Theories at ix (cited in note 65).
71 See id. at xiv, xxviii-xxx; Maitland, 3 Collected Papers at 310, 314-15 (cited in note
68).
,4 See, for example, N6kbm, Personality Conception at 52, 96-7 (cited in note 67); Fred-
erick Hallis, Corporate Personality xvi, xli (1930). N~kfm and Hallis disagreed with
Maitland that anything resembling rights inhered in either groups or individuals simply
because rights were based upon human beings.
71 Maitland, 3 Collected Papers at 314-15 (cited in note 68). See also the summary of
Maitland and Gierke in Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 Colum.L.Rev. 594, 602
(1924). The penetration of American legal insularity is nowhere better illustrated than the
publication in a leading American law review of this article, written by an English law pro-
fessor discussing the jurisprudential issues raised by German and English scholars.
1468 [54:1441
Personification of the Corporation
centralizing of power by the Church and then the state. According
to Gierke, the first use of fictive personification came in the thir-
teenth century by Pope Innocent IV. It was an attempt to harmo-
nize and unify society under God by conceiving of the Church as
His instrument, from which organized human activity flowed. In
this view the Church conceded to individuals the power to organize
institutions inferior to the Church. These institutions existed by
the grace of the Church and were therefore fictions, devoid of any
ultimate authority. As the state began to displace the Church as
the central institution of society, it appropriated the theory which
put the Church at the apex of the institutional hierarchy. The
early modern state deployed the theory as a justification for bring-
ing under its authority guilds and other organizations which com-
peted for the loyalties of its citizenry. Even in America, where the
state's power was suspect, its central role was reflected in the theo-
retically derivative position of intermediary institutions.76
While this fictive theory was triumphant, it never became uni-
versal. An organicist view of society grew up among some thinkers,
largely as a reaction to the strictly hierarchical view of the canon-
ists and legists, but in part an outgrowth of autonomous historical
roots. Standing in vivid contrast to the fictive vision, the or-
ganicists saw society as a collection of collectivities, each a legiti-
mate outgrowth of individuals united for purposes of their own.
Society formed through a union of these collectivities. Each collec-
tivity had a life of its own, its property not merely co-owned but
corporately dedicated to its purposes and not divisible, either actu-
ally or theoretically, among its members. These collectivities ex-
isted as a matter of fact, not at the behest of a superior body. And
while there could be hierarchies within each collectivity and among
the collectivities, one could not legitimately infer absolute sover-
eignty from mere residence at the apex of the hierarchy. Both
Maitland and Gierke recognized that the organicist view was not
ascendant, but both desired to revivify non-sovereign institutions,
difficult though they envisioned their struggle to be.77 They thus
propounded a theory, one with deep roots in continental history,
which they felt legitimated and empowered intermediary
institutions.
Their findings catalyzed a transatlantic search for a basis for
7' See Gierke, Political Theories at xxi-ii, xxxii, 87-100 (cited in note 65); John Dewey,
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655, 666-67 (1926).
7 See Gierke, Political Theories at xxv-xxvi, xxviii, xxxviii, xl, 70-71, 87, 95, 98 (cited in
note 65).
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the legitimacy of the corporation. For the corporation, the organi-
cist vision proved an emancipation. The theory saw corporations as
natural expressions of desires of the corporators. Consequently,
corporations obtained their political and thus legal status indepen-
dently from the state. From independence was inferred autonomy,
an autonomy which presupposed a subordinate position to the
state to be sure, but an autonomy that demanded the respect and
consequent restraint of the state. Furthermore, the organization of
the internal operations of the corporation was freed from the ne-
cessity of state sanction. The unfolding of this story by the com-
munity of legal intellectuals played a vital role in the actual asser-
tion of corporate autonomy by the practicing bar.
The practical value of the theory was immediately apparent to
scholars. The least that could be said for the theory was that it
better fit the law to the facts of the corporate world. But its practi-
cal value went beyond accurate description; the theory had instru-
mental value in legitimating the autonomy of corporate life. In re-
viewing the impact of the organicist theory on corporate
personality theory, Frederick Hallis concluded that while nearly all
the theorists on the continent and elsewhere had rejected what
they conceived to be a useless metaphysical approach, organicist
theory served as a useful addition to lawyers' tools. "[I]f therefore
juristic concepts are not true universals, they are not pure fictions
which have not relation to the true account of the real facts.
[I]t is a sufficient answer to those who say that juristic science
is not concerned with the real nature of social facts, but only with
what the lawyer makes of them, to point out that the law has a
practical and not a utopian aim. ' 78 If the new theories of corporate
personality attempted to subsume too much, from the state to lo-
cal clubs to business corporations, the "real nature of social facts"
was what had forced the rethinking.
To some, at first, the problem with deciding among the availa-
ble theories of the corporation was a problem only of wording. If
the problem lay with the use of the terms "grant," "artificial,"
"concession," or "fiction," then the remedy was to cease using the
terms. But, of course, the corporation was not of flesh and blood,
78 Hallis, Corporate Personality at xxxiii (cited in note 74). See also id. at xxix, xxxii-
xxxiv. Though Hallis' work was not published until 1930, be drew on changes in legal
thought which began in the mid-nineteenth century and proceeded until the time in which
he wrote. His book, an extended review of major thinkers on the subject of corporate per-
sonality, should be read in part as a critique of those theories and in part as an exercise in
the sociology of knowledge. For Hallis, the interactions of the thinkers he reviews were a
vital part of their thought.
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and the stubborn problem of the designation "person" com-
pounded rather than ended the confusion, for there were many en-
tities the law recognized. The problem lay in distinguishing among
them. Even the clarifying adjective "real" helped but little, for
something artificial could be real.79
In fact, the problem ran much deeper than wording. While no
theory which failed to solve the terminological problem could have
been successful, the reality of not only corporate existence but of
the enormity of corporate social, political, and economic influence
required a theory based on something besides the premises of the
fictive theory.80 The counsel of non-lawyers, including the pragma-
tist philosophers, had suddenly become valuable as jurists sought
to legitimate corporate autonomy. These outsiders alerted the ju-
rists to the continuing jealousy of the state, its fear of divided loy-
alties in its citizenry, the concomitant need for other institutions
to assume a subordinate place in society, and, paradoxically, the
need to preserve intermediary institutions as autonomous. While
the balance of individual thinkers focused their efforts on the fate
of the business corporation, many saw its fate entwined with the
fate of unions, clubs, and other societies.8
What united all the efforts to recognize corporations and other
associations as "real persons" or "real entities" relatively autono-
mous from the state was a common sense approach to associative
life. In the eyes of those who insisted upon the real person/real
entity theory, the functioning existence of a unit necessarily distin-
guished it from its members.82 Maitland set out the position quite
" One commentator discerned the difficulty: "If the personality of the corporation is a
fiction, it is at any rate not a fiction so transparent that we can at a glance see the truth
behind it." W.M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Quart.Rev. 90, 96 (1911). The terminolog-
ical confusion is most easily seen in the many different wordings adopted by the scholars
Hallis discussed.
80 Id. at 95-97; Machen, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 257-58 (cited at note 69); Arthur W. Machen,
Jr., Corporate Personality (Part 2), 24 Harv.L.Rev. 347, 360-61 (1911).
81 See Hallis, Corporate Personality at xvii, xix, xxiii, xxx, xxxvii-xxxviii, liii (cited in
note 74); Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 655, 657, 667 (cited in note 76); Maitland, 3 Collected
Papers at 310-12, 394-95 (cited in note 68); Laski, 29 Harv.L.Rev. at 405-06, 425-26 (cited in
note 69); Dodd, 42 Harv.L.Rev. at 1010 (cited in note 71); N6kdm, Personality Conception
at 31 n.15 (cited in note 67); Gierke, Political Theories at xli-xlii (cited in note 65).
82 Compare Maitland, 3 Collected Papers at 314-15 (cited in note 68); Hallis, Corporate
Personality at xxxvii (cited in note 74); Smith, 37 Yale L.J. at 288-89 (cited in note 69); and
Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 Colum.L.Rev. 643, 652-53
(1932) with Dodd, 42 Harv.L.Rev. at 979-81, 984-85 (cited in note 71), who argued that
while the courts could not properly recognize as real those entities which did not have the
sanction of the state, the legal system needed to recognize all entities as real. Dodd believed
that it was the combination of private organization and state sanction which defined corpo-
rate existence in a legal sense. It is important to remember that Dodd conceded the reality
1987] 1471
The University of Chicago Law Review
clearly very early in his writings: "[J]f n men unite themselves in
an organised body, jurisprudence, unless it wishes to pulverise the
group, must see n + 1 persons. And that for the mere lawyer
should I think be enough." 8
Maitland's use of the word "person" was crucial to his formu-
lation, though later and looser constructions sometimes used the
term "entity." "Person" carried with it powerful connotations in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. The irreducible unit of the com-
mon law was the individual person; if the corporation was a real
person, not an artificial creation of the state, was it not entitled to
the same respect as any flesh-and-blood person? While Maitland
intended to mean by person only "right-and-duty-bearing-unit,"
the word proved the perfect rhetorical weapon, asserting the pano-
ply of individualist protections for the corporation and shifting the
role of the state from guardian to invader of rights.
Ernst Freund, while eschewing the term person, deployed the
same rhetorical shield by analogy. The corporation, because it was
composed of rights-bearing individuals, could assert its claims as
would a person. "All parties to the joint relation have an interest
in the preservation of the integrity of the common right as against
third parties,-an interest as to which perfect harmony is natural,
and which is identical with the like interest of the holder of an
individual right.""4
The reality of the corporation apart from its members was be-
coming clearer as the relationship of the shareholders to the opera-
tions of the business became increasingly distant. Neither the cor-
poration nor the shareholders could be taken as agents for the
other; the actions of the one only rarely put the other at legal risk.
of association independent of the state; his argument presaged the extreme positivism of the
1930s which argued that no rights inhered in anyone or anything until acknowledged by the
state.
S" Maitland, 3 Collected Papers at 316 (cited in note 68).
" Freund, Corporations at 22 (cited in note 65). See also Max Radin, A Restatement of
Hohfeld, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1141, 1159-60 (1938) (arguing that a transference of rights could
not occur, but that rights could be created in others). Personification performed a second
important service for the real person/real entity theorists: it distinguished the corporation
from other recognized social units, such as the family. Personification focused attention on
the basis for rights and powers, the integrity of the organization. Organized activity and
social coherence were inadequate in themselves. See Maitland, 3 Collected Papers at 390
(cited in note 68); Freund, Corporations at 21-22. Preservation of the functional integrity of
the group allowed it to pursue its interests as freely as could a person. The unity of inter-
ests, including business interests, made the corporation real, legitimating claims it might
have both against outsiders who disrupted its operations and insiders who might seek to
disaggregate corporate property. See Freund, Corporations at 14, 22-23; Vinogradoff, 24
Colum.L.Rev. at 594 (cited in note 75); Hallis, Corporate Personality at li (cited in note 74).
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The "life" of the corporation could no longer be identified with
that of the corporators. A corporation's actions therefore had to be
recognized as autonomous, the product of its organization and
management.8 5
Baptized by association with heroic historical organizations,
their source and existence no longer a question for debate, corpora-
tions simultaneously had begun to spur interest in the control of
their operations and purpose."8 The abandonment of the corpora-
tion as a creature of positive law and the subsequent requirement
that the inner life of the corporation defined its autonomy em-
broiled the juristic community in a debate over what factors, pre-
cisely, made corporations persons. The debate centered on the is-
sue of corporate will as a function of corporate personality.
Whether a corporation could have a will, how it might be located
within the corporation, and how it expressed itself were the subsid-
iary questions.
At one level the debate simply recapitulated the debate over
corporate existence. One scholar, for example, conceded the reality
of corporate entities, only to deny that the entity had personality:
"In the last analysis, it is men and not legal entities whose rights
and liabilities the courts must decide. The corporate entity, or per-
sonification, which we call a corporation is regarded as having
rights and liabilities for the sake of convenience .... Therefore,
the proposition 'A corporation is a person' is either a mere meta-
phor or is a fiction of law.... But although corporate personality is
a fiction, the entity which is personified is no fiction. 8s7 The asser-
tion that personification was a metaphor, however powerful, left it
ill-equipped to deal with the analysis which saw rights and powers
actually inhering in corporations. In truth, it was a veiled assertion
of a partnership analogy because it saw nothing in a corporation
beyond the corporators and their convenience. The experience with
the corporation which had doomed the partnership analogy also
doomed the effort to see personification solely as a metaphor.
Equally ill-fated were the attempts to animate the corpora-
tion, which were not generally taken seriously in America.88 None-
theless, commentators recognized the births and deaths of corpora-
" Freund, Corporations at 22-23 (cited in note 65); Canfield, 17 Colum.L.Rev. at 128-30
(cited in note 69); Machen, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 258-62 (cited in note 69).
" Writings in the literature of personification after Freund and Maitland indicate the
triumph. See, for example, Machen, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 360 (cited in note 80); Laski, 29
Harv.L.Rev. at 413, 417, 425 (cited in note 69); Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 669 (cited in note 76).
V2 Machen, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 266-67 (cited in note 69).
88 See id. at 256.
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tions, and accepted that they possessed lives and the powers to
will, to act, and to create.8 9 Most who dealt with the topic of corpo-
rate personality did not find it necessary to use such constructions.
Instead, they saw corporate personality in terms of the legal rela-
tionships generated by the material operations of the corporation.
This somewhat less anthropomorphic analysis looked to a corpora-
tion's structure, its finances, and most important, to its manage-
ment, in order to locate corporate Will.90
The ascendance of management strengthened the analytic
force of the real person/real entity theory and was in turn legiti-
mated by it. Ernst Freund's brilliant exposition of the notion of
undivided control over property within a corporation remains the
intellectual foundation of the position of management. In Freund's
view, undivided control was the necessary outcome of the nature of
corporate property holding. Because an individual corporator could
neither use corporate property as a personal asset, nor generally be
held responsible for corporate debts, the usual linkage of owner-
ship and control did not exist.
Furthermore, a shareholder could participate in any number
of relations with a corporation which would appear contradictory
unless a clear division existed between the rights of the corporation
and the rights of its shareholders. For example, the power to sue a
corporation in which one held stock would be senseless if the cor-
poration were a mere convenience for arranging one's own
property. 1
Control differentiated co-ownership and corporate ownership.
The shareholder renounced control over his property and freed
himself from responsibility for the consequences of how control
was exercised. The interest all shareholders had in maintaining the
integrity of corporate property meant that the reassertion of con-
trol was also strictly limited. One could sell shares, but only under
the rarest of circumstances could one dissolve the entity. The in-
ability to destroy the corporate body stood in stark contrast to the
image of the corporation suggested by the partnership analogy,
"' See for example, Vinogradoff, 24 Colum.L.J. at 595 (cited in note 75); Hallis, Corpo-
rate Personality at xxxv (cited in note 74); N6k~m, Personality Conception at 32-33 (cited in
note 67). N~kim's view is the most interesting. Having accepted that human beings and
corporations are alike in essential respects, he denied that in either case it necessarily fol-
lowed that they had rights.
90 See Gierke, Political Theories at xxxix, xli (cited in note 65); Hallis, Corporate Per-
sonality at xxxv (cited in note 74); Henry E. Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation,
and the Conflict of Laws, 42 Harv.L.Rev. 516, 547-49 (1929).
91 Freund, Corporations at 9-10 (cited in note 65).
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making the work of the organicists all the more appealing to corpo-
ration theorists in America. The task before those theorists was to
explain how management control was legitimate.92
For the problem of management control, Freund also had a
solution. Modern theories of property began with the assumption
that a person's control over and interest in property should be con-
current. In this view the right to control, the preeminent property
right, was defined by a person's interest in the property. Freund
disputed the universal necessity of such a relationship. The law
recognized numerous instances, he said, where interest and control
were separate. Property held in trust and joint tenancy were two
such instances, though there were also cases in which the interest
was inchoate or evanescent and establishing the locus of control
was impossible. Other jurists joined with Freund and argued that
interest was insufficient to establish control, that control followed
from the purpose to which the interest was dedicated. Sharehold-
ers in a corporation had voluntarily committed themselves to an
enterprise whose purpose required, first and foremost, the unity of
their combined property under a single "mind." As Harold Laski
put it in 1916, "Just as we have been compelled by the stern exi-
gencies of events to recognize that the corporation is distinct from
its members, so, too, we have to recognise that its mind is distinct
from their minds."93
Practical experience, not just anthropomorphism, fixed the
corporate mind in the management hierarchy. Freund's principle
of representation was the basis for all corporate action. Because
continuing joint control of corporate property was impossible, cor-
porators delegated their powers to the shareholding majority of
their number who in turn named representatives, the management.
Human beings within a corporation were its instruments. Just as
they acted in pursuit of its purpose, they determined how its pur-
pose was to be interpreted.94 Thus, change in managerial personnel
did not necessarily effect a change in operations, just as a change
in shareholders did not necessarily effect a change in the structure
of the entity. Sir Paul Vinogradoff explained the relevance of rep-
resentation to the powers of management.
91 See id. at 10, 13; Geldart, 27 L.Quart.Rev. at 97-98 (cited in note 79); Machen, 24
Harv.L.Rev. at 255-56 (cited in note 69).
" 29 Harv.L.Rev. at 415 (cited in note 69). See also Freund, Corporations at 15-22, 33-
34, 41-43 (cited in note 65); Geldart, 27 L.Quart.Rev. at 99; Vinogradoff, 24 Colum.L.J. at
604 (cited in note 75). Personification asserts itself in Laski's imagery, reinforcing the or-
ganic vision of the corporation.
94 Freund, Corporations at 23-25, 28-30, 34; Vinogradoff, 24 Colum.L.Rev. at 595.
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How is the law to deal with such superindividual undertak-
ings? The usual expedient is to assimilate them to live per-
sons. We assign to them a will, i.e., the faculty of taking re-
solves in the midst of conflicting motives; a governing brain
and nerves, in the shape of institutions and agents; a capacity
for the promotion and the defence of interests by holding
property, performing acts in law, and exercising rights of ac-
tion in courts. 5
Corporations, unlike corporeal persons, were immortal. The
original purpose to which corporate property was dedicated might
cease to be economically relevant, endangering the interests of the
shareholders. Because the corporators could not easily dissolve the
corporation, indeed because they were an ever-changing commu-
nity, the power to adapt had to reside with management. Protect-
ing the integrity of the corporate entity required flexibility. In the
"brain" of the corporation jurists found the capacity to will
change.9 6
Because power to act had been delegated to the majority and
its representatives, one looked to them to discover corporate will.
Freund put it as follows:
[A]s to corporate will. In its simplest and most obvious mean-
ing this is the personal will of the associates acting under the
bond of association. This will is the product of mutual per-
sonal influence and of the influence of a common purpose, fre-
quently also the result of compromise and submission. Where
under the operation of these factors we obtain a unanimous
resolution, we may clearly speak of corporate will. But we are
also justified in assuming a correct expression of corporate
will, where of the associated persons only a portion, represen-
tative in numbers, character, and position, act habitually,
while the rest sustain a relation of acquiescence, dependence,
or incapacity.9 7
The implications for corporate development were clear enough. A
corporation could be bound only by the unwillingness of share-
holders to acquiesce in managerial actions, not by limits set in the
95 Vinogradoff, 24 Colum.L.Rev. at 595.
96 Freund, Corporations at 34-35, 59-60; Vinogradoff, 24 Colum.L.Rev. at 596-97, 604;
Geldart, 27 L.Quart.Rev. at 105-06 (cited in note 79). See also Hallis's discussions of "Prag-
matic Jurisprudence" and "The Theory of Subjective Rights as Legally Protected Inter-
ests," in Corporate Personality at 75-105, 166-88 (cited in note 74).
97 Freund, Corporations at 52 (cited in note 65). See also id. at 60.
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charter. As Geldart noted: "We may, perhaps, expect that a judge
who holds a belief in the personality of a society will be less ready
than heretofore to see in trusts and incorporating documents fun-
damental immutable provisions, more ready to see an implied in-
herent power of development.""8 Freund realized that this will
could even be placed in a person who owned no shares in the cor-
poration, completely severing the assumed relationship between in-
terest and control.9
By the 1920s the results of the efforts of the real person/real
entity theorists were apparent. The psychological assimilation of
the corporation to the individual contained the connotative powers
of personification while the representative analysis set out by
Ernst Freund provided a justification for management's assump-
tion of control of corporate affairs. Freund's conception of the flow
of power, from the shareholders to the management, was some-
thing of a holdover from the earlier partnership conception of the
corporation when it could be said that most members of the corpo-
ration were actively involved with its affairs. In the publicly held
industrial corporations that were created in the 1890s and after,
however, the shareholders were more properly viewed as creations
of managements seeking capital for a variety of purposes. But even
Freund anticipated the power of the psychological association
when he commented upon the tendency of persons to designate the
utterances of corporate officials not as the opinions of the officers
themselves, but rather as the point of view of the corporation it-
self. He had hoped that his approach to corporate organization
would avoid the extreme organicism 0 e of continental jurisprudence
by shifting attention to the real activities of the corporation while
at the same time creating a social compact theory of the corpora-
tion.101 The undreamt of explosion of the business corporations,
, Geldart, 27 L.Quart.Rev. at 106 (cited in note 79). See also Laski, 29 Harv.L.Rev. at
412-13 (cited in note 69), on the inevitable decline of ultra vires. Horwitz, 88 W.Va.L.Rev.
at 186-88 (cited in note 41) gives the history of its demise.
" Freund, Corporations at 57 (cited in note 65).
100 Organicism at its most extreme subsumed the individual almost entirely. "As biolo-
gists spoke of the human body, so political philosophers were wont to speak of the state and
society as an organism. The entire philosophy of the Hegelian school was permeated
throughout by the analogy, and its politics made no secret of it. To-day, even those who
trace their philosophic thought to Hegel find it necessary to moderate the organic theory of
society." Hallis, Corporate Personality at 166 (cited in note 74).
101 Freund, Corporations at 70-71 (cited in note 65). See generally Navin and Sears, 29
Bus.Hist.Rev. 105 (cited in note 8). Navin and Sears make the point most clearly in their
discussion of the types of securities issued to attract capital: "A number of the preferred
issues carried no voting rights, a fact that is hardly surprising when one remembers that the
'owners' of these companies, in liquidating a part of their investment, usually had no inten-
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both in number and size, had simply consumed Freund's theory
and used it in an unexpected manner. The efforts of most jurists
during and after the decade were directed toward keeping the psy-
chological association from dominating the representative descrip-
tion. The real person/real entity theorists had wrought better than
they knew.
V. THE DECLINE OF CORPORATION THEORY
After the early 1920s analysts were concerned with how so
powerful an image had been created and what its results might be.
Critics of the real person/real entity theory had earlier suggested
that it was a powerful tool to fill the gaps in legal thought on the
corporation. Lawyers and judges resorted to personification if they
could come up with no better argument for how a corporation
should be treated.10 2 Such insinuations of indolence did not, how-
ever, explain why lawyers and judges resorted to such imagery.
The conjunction of the introduction of non-legal materials into
the legal process 0" and the language of personification 04 had com-
bined to form an image of an autonomous, creative, self-directed
economic being. This image permeated the community at large and
especially the legal community. The general terms of discourse
conditioned the way human beings thought about corporations,
their structure, and their actions. As Bryant Smith suggested in an
address to the Round Table on Business Associations in 1926, "It
is believed that most of the confusion of thought with respect to
the subject comes from the disposition to read into legal personal-
ity the qualities of natural human personality. '10 5
The "reading in" took place despite the vigorous opposition of
even the most concerted real person/real entity theorists. Freund
had disparaged the use of the idea of any moral personality of the
corporation as metaphysical; he was concerned, after all, with the
legal relationships its operations generated. Later commentators
simply dismissed the imprecise everyday use of the terms "person-
tion of relinquishing control." Id. at 119.
102 See, for example, Machen, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 351-52, 355-58 (cited in note 80).
'01 Freund anticipated this outcome. See Freund, Corporations at 80-81 (cited in note
65). For the later analysis see Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 657-59 (cited in note 76); N~kbn,
Personality Conception at 100 (cited in note 67); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a
Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 597, 606-07 (1936).
104 See Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 662 (cited in note 76); N&kAm, Personality Conception at
36, 53-55, 121 (cited in note 67); Latty, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 604-05.
"05 37 Yale L.J. at 291 (cited in note 69) (footnote omitted). See also Wolff, 54
L.Quart.Rev. at 507 (cited in note 71); Nkfm, Personality Conception at 35-36, 39, 58-59.
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ality" and "will" as irrelevant." 6 In doing so, however, they were
resorting to an expedient that had early been crushed by the insis-
tence that the everyday experience of the corporation was relevant
to its juristic conception. The personified corporation had, by the
1920s, completely absorbed the imagery which had suited the real
person/real entity theorists only as an analogy.
Fear that the imagery would lead to deleterious decisions by
the courts motivated the concerned theorists. Their protests were
not limited to arguments that the "reading in" was metaphysical
and irrelevant. Most considered it simply unnecessary, believing
that the representative theory of corporate personality subsumed
the everyday usage wherever it might be valuable.107 A more com-
plex criticism argued that personality per se should not yield sub-
stantive decisions. Bryant Smith was quite explicit in his
condemnation:
It is not the part of legal personality to dictate conclusions.
To insist that because it has been decided that a corporation
is a legal person for some purposes it must therefore be a legal
person for all purposes, or to insist that because it has been
decided that a partnership is not a legal person for some pur-
poses it cannot therefore be so for any purposes, is to make of
both corporate personality and partnership impersonality a
master rather than a servant, and to decide legal questions on
irrelevant considerations without inquiry into their merits. Is-
sues do not properly turn upon a name. 08
Using corporate personality was, others argued, a blanket either
hiding inappropriate reasoning or justifying an improper
decision.1°9
The adoption of the real person/real entity theory did not
merely raise questions about the use of its imagery by the courts
and practicing attorneys. It also led to a profound reassessment of
the theory itself, which coincided with the rise of legal realism.
The astonishingly rapid erosion of the fictive conception under the
pressure of the partnership analogy, followed in turn almost imme-
10 Freund, Corporations at 75-77 (cited in note 65); Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 656 (cited
in note 76); N~kfim, Personality Conception at 30, 55.
20 Nkfim, Personality Conception at 40, 59-60, 62, 93-96; Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 660-
63; Latty, 34 Mich.L.Rev. at 599-600 (cited in note 103).
108 Smith, 37 Yale L.J. at 298 (cited in note 69) (footnote omitted).
101 Latty, 34 Mich.L.Rev. at 598, 600, 621-630 (cited in note 103); N&k6m, Personality
Conception at 37, 42-43, 49, 57-8, 67 (cited in note 67); Wolff, 54 L.Quart.Rev. at 501-03
(cited in note 71).
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diately by the real person/real entity theory, had set in motion an
intellectual dynamic which had begun to take on a life of its own.
Even while defending the idea that a corporation was real, some
legal thinkers, including the realists, had begun to argue that its
reality was an unimportant jurisprudential consideration.
What the realists saw as important were the interests that so-
ciety deemed worthy of protection. It was clear to the realists that
society had an interest in the proper functioning of corporate prop-
erty. The capacity to produce goods and services, to employ the
workforce, to innovate, and to grow - these were society's inter-
ests and were therefore the objects of the legal system's protec-
tions. Individuals also had interests in a functioning system of cor-
porate property that society might wish to protect and promote.
Gerard Henderson's landmark work, The Position of Foreign Cor-
porations in American Constitutional Law, made interests, not in-
herent rights, the premise of his analysis. Concluding his explana-
tion for the protection of corporate property he wrote: "In this
sense anything can be made a legal unit, and the subject of rights
and duties, a fund, a building, a child unborn, a family. There is no
reason, except the practical one, why, as some one has suggested,
the law should not accord to the last rose of summer a legal right
not to be plucked." 110
The realist jurists and philosophers thus began to argue that
theories of corporate personality were entirely fungible. John
Dewey's stunning eulogy on the problem closed with a plea for at-
tention to the facts: "[T]he assertion of the simple fact that there
is some social reality involved got bound up with the notion of a
real, as distinct from fictitious personality. The example, it seems
to me, is sufficiently striking to enforce the value of eliminating the
idea of personality until the concrete facts and relations involved
have been faced and stated on their own account: retaining the
word will then do no great harm." '
110 Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Consti-
tutional Law 166 (1918) (footnotes omitted).
" Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 673 (cited in note 76) (emphasis in original). See also Latty,
34 Mich.L.Rev. at 605, 611 (cited in note 103); Radin, 51 Harv.L.Rev. at 1144 (cited in note
84); N~kim, Personality Conception at 44, 46-48, 113 (cited in note 67). N~kin character-
ized the debate over corporate personality as barren.
Some insight may be had into Dewey's position by reference to his other work. His
attack on pure conceptualism may be understood in terms of his general epistemology. In a
chapter entitled "Experience and Reason" he wrote, "As the particular was a stepping-stone
to image and habit, so the latter may become a stepping-stone to conceptions and princi-
ples. But the latter leave experience behind, untouched; they do not react to rectify it."
John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 81 (1920).
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The jurists had adopted a new vision of rights in general and
applied it to corporations. This new vision, to one degree or an-
other, denied that rights inhered in anything; it saw only interests
to be protected after society determined that the interests de-
served protection. The state had become the creator and adminis-
trator of rights; the corporation, and for that matter human beings,
the subject of rights. In this sense whether corporations resembled
human beings was utterly irrelevant because personhood no longer
constituted the basis for rights." 2
The realist attack on conceptualism in legal thought simply
displaced corporation theory. Corporations, a leading modern ex-
ample of human association, were reduced to a bundle of interests
recognized by the larger society. The autonomy of the corporation,
once rich with political and social as well as economic meaning,
had been narrowly confined to the expectations society had of the
business unit.
Within a few years the direction of scholarship dealing with
the corporation was clear. Adolf A. Berle, a lawyer, and Gardiner
C. Means, an economist, published The Modern Corporation and
Private Property in 1933. Drawn almost exclusively from materials
dealing with corporate finance, it proved to be a remarkably endur-
ing piece of scholarship and its importance as a work of organiza-
tional theory is indisputable. The differences between it and earlier
scholarship on the corporation are, however, quite startling. It as-
sumed the permanence and the power of the business corporation,
its hierarchical structure, and its dominance among the various
ways of organizing business operations. Gone was any concern with
the political or social justification of corporate autonomy. The
book exemplified the inability of realist scholarship to provide a
framework for legal thought to reach beyond contemporary condi-
tions. In accepting the contemporary status of corporations, it
abandoned the corporation as an example of human association
and left it only a model of a business unit, and a static one at that.
Berle and Means' suggestion that the acts of large corporations be
viewed as a variety of state action, for example, was a failure be-
cause it was neither logically nor experientially a necessary result
112 The literature on rights theory is plentiful. For the relationship of the corporation to
rights theory at the time, see Latty, 34 Mich.L.Rev. at 601, 615, 630-36 (cited in note 103);
Smith, 37 Yale L.J. at 283, 293 (cited in note 69); Foley, 42 Harv.L.Rev. at 518-19 (cited in
note 90); Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 655 (cited in note 76); Wolff, 54 L.Quart.Rev. at 494, 505-
09, 511 (cited in note 71); Nktmn, Personality Conception at 27-29, 31-38, 43, 69 (cited in
note 67).
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of the separation of ownership and control. The suggestion; in fact,
seemed to harken back to the grant theory while being blind to the
reality of corporate autonomy. In this sense Maitland, for example,
was more realistic than Berle and Means because he conceived of
powerful intermediary institutions; Berle and Means saw only cor-
porations that were almost as powerful as governments and tried
to analogize the corporation to the state.
Whatever the merits of the realist conception as a philosophi-
cal or jurisprudential position, the political events which trauma-
tized the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the traditionally strong Anglo-
American belief in rights, combined to provoke a strong reaction to
its seemingly amoral view of law. While the -realist attack had
robbed corporation theory of its larger intellectual content, it had
failed to replace the rhetorical tradition of personification because
it had nothing to replace it with. The economic and political conse-
quences of personification suggested that the protests of the legal
theorists who wanted to dispose of the rhetorical tradition were
largely in vain. Even they acknowledged that the autonomy that
the real person/real entity theory had fostered had engendered
consequences which created issues vital to the future of industrial
society.11 The most perceptive among them recognized that the
very terminology society used to deal with institutions shaped the
thought about those institutions. Thurman Arnold, then a law pro-
fessor at Yale and something of an intellectual eccentric, even
among the legal realists, devoted much of his The Folklore of Cap-
italism precisely to the issue of corporate personification and au-
tonomy. He believed that the imagery of personification had sub-
stantially altered the very ways in which people thought about
private property, and that this in turn affected business practice
and government policy. 1 4
Personification with its roots in historic theological disputes
and modern business necessity, had proved to be a potent symbol
to legitimate the autonomous business corporation and its manage-
ment. Private property rights had been transferred to associations,
associations had themselves become politically legitimate, and the
combination had helped foster modern political economy. The cor-
poration, once the derivative tool of the state, had become its rival,
and the successes of autonomous corporate management turned
113 Dewey, 35 Yale L.J. at 664 (cited in note 76); Radin, 51 Harv.L.Rev. at 1144 (cited
in note 84); Geldart, 27 L.Quart.Rev. at 104 (cited in note 79).
." Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (1937). See especially chapters VI,
VIII, and IX.
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the basis for belief in an individualist conception of property on its
head. The protests of modern legists notwithstanding, the business
corporation had become the quintessential economic man.
